




The U.S. grain marketing system has undergone many structural changes in the
1980s. In no part of the system has structural change been more far-reaching and
extensive than in farmer-owned cooperatives. The purpose of this paper is to analyze
changes in grain marketing and induced structural adjustments in grain marketing
cooperativesatthelocal, regional, andinterregionallevels. Theimpactofthesestructural
changes on thecompetitive postureofcooperatives in thegrain marketingsystem is also
discussed along with structural adjustments anticipated in the 1990s.
The U.S. grainmarketingsystem is a dynamicsystem thatchangesin response
to market forces. This is an important strength of a private enterprise system
in contrast to government owned and operated grain marketing systems that
characterize many countries. But, changes in demand placed upon the u.s.
grain marketing system resulting from changes in economic variables such
as grain production, exports, transportation, and government programs are
frequently abrupt and difficult to predict. Hence, investments in marketing
infrastructure are often risky and sometimes painful. The grain marketing
system can move from undercapacity to excess capacity in a short time span.
This usually induces structural change in the system.
Grain and soybeans have typically ranked second only to dairy products in
the business volume of all U.S. agricultural marketing cooperatives. In 1988,
1,484 grain marketing cooperatives in the United States had a total business
volume of$12.4 billion (Cooperative Business Volume). However, the share of
grain and oilseed marketings by farmers handled by cooperatives declined in
the 1980s. The reasons for this decline are discussed in this paper. But first,
why and howdidgrain marketingcooperativesdevelopto achieve theimportant
role they play in the U.s. grain marketing system?
Development of Grain Marketing Cooperatives
Marketfailure is frequently cited as theeconomicjustification for agricultural
marketingcooperatives. The rapid developmentoflocal grain marketingcoop-
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eratives (farmers' elevators) in the early part of this century is a classic case in
point. TheReportofthe Federal Trade Commission on the Grain Trade (U.S. Federal
Trade Commission) in 1920 described the reduction orelimination ofcompeti-
tion for farmers' grain at country points. Large corporations had established
chains ofelevators alonga given railroad line, commonly called "line elevators."
These line elevators were in a position to exercise considerable power to force
local buyers to come to price agreements with them under the threatofputting
them out of business. Also, in states where independent elevators were more
important than lines, both types ofhouses formed state grain dealers' associa-
tions through which competition was restricted.
The development of farmers' elevators was rapid after 1905, and by 1922
there were atleast 5,000 suchconcerns in operation Qesness). By the mid-1920s
the share of grain marketings originated by local farmer cooperatives ranged
from 35 to 45 percent (Bunker and Cook).
Regional grain marketing cooperatives developed after locals, but they also
had their beginnings in the early 1900s. For example, the Equity Cooperative
Exchangewas organizedin 1911. Itwas anoutgrowthoffeelings thatconditions
in the terminal markets were working hardships on grain farmers. The
Exchange began operations in Minneapolis but was barred from membership
in the Minneapolis Chamber ofCommerce (the Grain Exchange). It moved its
headquarters to St. Paul in 1914 where it built a terminal elevator. It also
gradually acquired ownership of85 country elevators by October 1921. There
were many bitter encounters between the Equity Cooperative Exchange and
the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce Qesness). This culminated in a cease
and desistorderto the latterorganization issued by the FederalTradeCommis-
sion in 1923 (FTC Complaint).
The Equity Cooperative Exchange was reorganized as the Farmers Union
TerminalAssociation, which became the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Asso-
ciation in 1936. The latter merged in 1983 with North Pacific Grain Growers,
another regional cooperative, to become Harvest States Cooperatives, which
today is the nation's largest grain marketing cooperative.
Regional grain cooperatives developed rapidly from 1925-35 as the Federal
Farm Board and its Farmers National Grain Corporation (FNGC) provided
financial support for regional cooperatives through which ill-fated price stabili-
zation activities were conducted. The FNGC was dissolved in 1938, butregional
grain marketing cooperatives reestablished themselves and went on to increase
their shareofgrain marketings to 21-25 percentby the late 1970s (Bunkerand
Cook).
The Producers Export Company (PEC) was organized as an interregional
grain marketing cooperative in 1958 in an attempt by 22 regional cooperatives
to integrate their operations into grain export markets. PEC was established
with resources sufficient only to operate as an export broker. The PEC system
ofhaving the member regionals ofan exportinterregional manage and control
port elevators was identified as a strategic problem in the late sixties, and PEC
was dissolved. In 1968, seven regionals formed the Farmers Export Company,
an interregional grain marketing cooperative, and built a new port elevator at
Ama, Louisiana (Reynolds).
By 1977, cooperatives had increased their shareofdirect grain exports to 11
percentoftotal U.S. grain exports. They also indirectly sold through their own68 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
port elevators another 6 percent, making cooperatives the seller or handler of
17 percent of U.S. exports of grains (Bunker and Cook).
Regional and interregional cooperatives went on to increase their annual
grain volume from 1.8 billion bushels in fiscal 1977 to 3 billion bushels in 1981.
In the latteryear, theAgriculturalCooperativeServicealso reported 16 regional
grain cooperatives and three interregional cooperatives (Thurston and Cum-
mins). This was the zenith year both for the total volume ofU.S. grain exports
and also for regional and interregional grain marketing cooperatives. It also
marked the beginning of a decade in which a downsizing of farmer-owned
grain marketing cooperatives would occur. To understand the economics of
these changes, one has to look at the stimulus to investment in marketing
infrastructure resulting from the expansion of grain exports in the 1970s.
The Grain Export Boom ofthe 1970s
The 1970s will go down in history as the goldendecade for Americanagricul-
ture and its grain marketing system. After more than 25 years when surplus
stocks and government price support operations dominated grain markets and
marketing, the 1972-73 marketingyear usheredin a newera. Grain production
shortfalls, notably in the Soviet Union, but in other countries as well, increased
the export demand for American grain. U.S. grain exports more than doubled
from 1.7 billion bushels in 1971 to a record 3.5 billion bushels in 1973. Grain
prices also more than doubled in 1973 as market prices rose above support
prices. Grain exports continued to increase for the remainder of the decade,
reaching an all-time record of nearly 5 billion bushels in 1980 (figure 1). The
U.S. share of the world grain export market also rose to a peak of60 percent
in the same year.
The grain export boom of the 1970s put a severe strain on the marketing
system, but it accommodated this tripling of grain exports during the decade
with a minimum of disruptions. This was an accomplishment of considerable
magnitude. Marketing margins increased as the demand for marketing infra-
structure and services exceeded the supply. This stimulated investments in rail
cars, barges, storage, and port facilities, much of which did not come on-line
until the 1980s when grain exports began an extended period of decline.
Another important economic impact of the increase in grain exports in the
1970s was that it enabled the Commodity Credit Corporation (Ccq, the price
supporting agency of the U.S. government, to dispose of its grain stocks that
had been accumulated in the post-World War II period under price support
operations. Hence, CCC stocks no longer served as a lid on market prices, so
grain price variability increased. Greater price variability increased hedging
needs, which pushed the volume offutures tradingin grainand grain products
to a record level of 39.5 million futures contracts in 1980.
Marketingdecisionsand pricerisk managementemergedas newandcomplex
problems for farmers and their grain marketing cooperatives in the 1970s.
Many cooperative managers were not well equipped or trained to operate in
this new market environment. Most of their experience had been during the
post-World War II period when CCC-owned grain stocks were high and rising,
and cooperatives earned most oftheir income through storage and grain han-
dling for the CCe. They did not have to be concerned with markets, cash-
futures price relationships, and hedging.Grain Marketing Cooperatives/Dahl
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Grain Exports Decline, Excess Capacity
Emerges in the 1980s
The decade of the 1980s got off to an inauspicious start with President
Carter's embargoon grain exports to the Soviet Union. Also, the world slid into
a prolonged recession in which world grain trade declined. U.S. grain exports
bore the brunt of this painful adjustment. Aided by a strong dollar and the
price umbrella provided by our government programs, other grain exporting
countries increased their production and provided stiffer competition for U.S.
grain exports. Our grain exports declined nearly 2 billion bushels from their
record highof5 billion bushels in 1980to 3 billion bushels in 1986. Competition
for the reduced volume drove marketing margins down, and the new invest-
ments in rail cars, barges, and port elevators resulted in a surplus of such
marketing infrastructure, which became burdensome.
As exports declined in the 1980s, stocks ofgrain accumulated, despite sizable
acreage idled under federal farm programs. Most of these stocks were stored
under government programs such as the farmer-owned reserve, regular price
support loan, and CCC ownership. Grain stocks reached an all-time highof8.4
billion bushels at the end ofthe 1986--87 marketing year (figure 1). The grain
marketing system was again back in the business ofstoring and handling grain70 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
for the government in a big way. The income from such operations increased
offsetting declines in income, in part at least, from grain merchandising associ-
ated with reducedexportsandmarketingmargins. HarvestStates Cooperatives,
for example, reported a record gross income from storage and handling of
$24.6 million in 1987. This was a substantial contributor to their net earnings
from all operationsof$11 million in the same year (HarvestStates Cooperatives
1988). This was typical oftheoperationofmany local grain marketingcoopera-
tives during the same period.
The world grain situation has changed again in the last three years, resulting
in an increase of U.S. grain exports to 4.5 billion bushels in 1989. This is still
500 million bushels below their record level in 1980. The drought of 1988
dramatically reduced U.S. grain production, resulting in an unprecedented
reduction in ending U.S. grain stocks from their record level of 8.4 billion
bushels in 1986-87 to an estimated 3 billion bushels in 1989-90 (figure 1).
This brief recap of trends in grain exports and stocks over the past two
decades illustrates how quickly and dramatically the load placed on the grain
marketingsystem canchange. Howhasthestructureofgrainmarketingcooper-
atives changed in response to these changes in demand?
Economics of Structural Change
Cooperatives' share of farm marketings of grain and soybeans has been
substantial for many years, but their share declined in the 1980s. The Agricul-
tural Cooperative Service estimates that cooperatives' share ofgrain marketed
by farmers declined from 36 percent in 1982 to 30 percent in 1988 (Kraenzle).
Thiswas largely attributable to the downsizingofoperations at the regional and
interregional levels. However, structural change also occurred in local grain
marketing cooperatives.
Unit Train Rates Change Local Cooperative Structure
Grain cooperatives developed first at the local or country level, and it is here
wherecooperatives haveachieved theirgreatestmarketpenetration. Local grain
cooperatives have traditionally performed threeimportanteconomic functions:
grain assembly, grain storage, and farm supply merchandising.
The principal marketingfunction performedby earlylocal graincooperatives
was grain assembly. They boughtgrain from surrounding farms and assembled
it in quantities large enough to ship to terminal markets in single rail cars. Rail
remained thedominanttransportationmode until trucks cameinto heavy usage
after World War II. Trucks also enabled some large farmers to bypass the local
cooperative and ship directly to terminals. Grain transport by river barge also
came into heavy usage at this time. Truck and barge transportation of grain
dovetailed well together. Both took sizable volumes ofbusiness away from the
railroads.
The railroads' response to increased truck-barge competition was to offer
special multicar (unit train) rates on shipments of 25, 50, 75, or more cars.
Theseunittrain rates wereconsiderablylowerthansinglecarratesand provided
a powerful incentive for country elevators to modernize theirload-out facilities
to take advantage of these lower rates. The unit train rates also stimulated the
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receive grain from other elevators, and sometimes directly from farmers, and
ship it out in unit trains. Multicar shipping country elevators and the new
subterminals expanded rapidly in the 1970s. Investments were facilitated by
record earnings of local elevators during this period, providing equity capital
for improvements.
A North Dakota study reported that by 1984 there were 544 multicar rail
loading facilities, over halfofwhich were cooperatives, in the four-state areaof
Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota. This represented considerable
excess unit train loading capacity in all these states, particularly in Iowa, which
had 5.83 bushelsofunittrain loadingcapacity for every bushelofgrainshipped
out of the state by rail or truck (Cobia, Wilson, Gunn, and Coon).
The impact of excess capacity on local grain marketing cooperatives in the
Eighth Farm Credit District is analyzed by Ginder (1985) who points out that
about 20 percentofthe firms controlling more than 25 percent ofthe industry
assets were in a financially stressed condition in late 1984. He cautioned that if
these firms are forced to liquidate, asset markets for grain origination will be
depressed.
In another North Dakota study, Clow and Wilson point out that unit train
rates increased competition for grain, which forced country elevators to either
become larger or consolidate with other elevators and operate as a multiplant
firm. Many cooperative elevators consolidated in the 1980s, and new subtermi-
nals were constructed. The consolidated elevators acted as feeder stations for
new cooperative subterminals. This multiple-plant system enabled the coopera-
tive subterminals to obtain sufficient volumes ofgrain for unit train shipments.
By 1987, there were 22 multiple-plant elevators operatingin North Dakota and
116 elevators in the state with unit train loading capability. A cost analysis in
this study showed that a multiple-plant firm must handle up to seven times
moregrainthana single-plantfirm inorderto useall theirgrainstoragecapacity
and reach their minimum average costs (most efficient scale). At no time has
theaveragebeenclose to theneeded 22 million bushels for multiple-plantfirms.
Excess capacity in unit train shipping facilities and increased competition for
grainsqueezedgrainmerchandisingmargins. Thiswas mitigated to someextent
by increasedstorageincomeas carryoverstocks accumulatedundergovernment
programs in the 1980s. Grain storage capacity in the Vnited States increased as
exportdemand declined and stocks accumulated under government programs.
The total ofon-farm and off-farm (commercial) grain storagecapacity reached
22.2 billion bushels (nearly two years oftotal V.S. yearly grain production) on
December 1,1989. This was up from 17 billion bushels in 1978, an increase of
31 percent for the decade. But, the precipitous drop in grain stocks as a result
ofthe 1988 drought has resulted in excess storagecapacity and reduced storage
income for grain marketing cooperatives (Gunn and Cobia).
Cash Trade at Grain Exchanges and Terminals Declines
Regional cooperatives were organized to market farmers' grain at grain
exchanges in terminal markets such as Chicago, Kansas City, and Minneapolis.
An important function of these exchanges in earlier years was the marketing
of single rail cars of grain on the basis of samples consigned from country
elevators to commission firms at the exchanges. Regional cooperatives func-72 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
tioned as commission firms for affiliated local cooperatives. But, buying and
selling grain on a sample basis has largely been replaced by forward "to arrive"
cash contracts between country elevators and grain merchants where price,
grade, premiums, and discounts for quality are agreed to in the contract. The
consignment method ofmarketing grain has virtually disappeared. Grain com-
mission firms have also largely disappeared or changed their operations to
become grain merchants assumingtitle to the grain they handle. As the market-
ing ofgrain by sample diminished, cash grain trade at smaller exchanges such
as Duluth, St. Louis, Omaha, and Toledo declined even more sharply than at
the primary futures exchanges at Chicago, Kansas City, and Minneapolis.
Today most cash grain is traded by telephone. Merchants and processors,
including regional cooperatives, telephone bid prices each day to countryeleva-
tors, usually for forward delivery. Forward selling enables country elevators to
fix the price as they purchase grain from farmers and have time to schedule
load-out and shipping. Regional cooperatives have few captive customers
amongtheiraffiliated locals. Theirprice bids mustbe competitive with investor-
oriented firms (IOFs) or they lose the business.
Changes in transportation have been even larger dynamic factors contribut-
ing to the decline ofcash grain trade at terminal markets and accelerating the
move to a decentralized grainmarketingsystem. Theincreased volumeofgrain
shipped by truck bypassed terminal rail markets and was not traded at grain
exchanges whatsoever. Grain was trucked directly to processors or to river
terminals for shipment by barge on interior waterways.
Innovative new multicar rates offered by railroads to competewith increased
truck-barge competition were point-to-point rates thatdid notinclude the tran-
sit privilege. Transit was an integral part of the railroad rate structure under
which grain could be stopped at intermediate points between origin and final
destination for inspection, storage, or processing without additional charge.
Thethru rateappliedundertransitbilling. As moremulticarrates were offered
by the railroads, the transit privilege was eroded and virtually eliminated.
The demise of the transit privilege and deregulation of the railroads as
authorized by the Staggers Act of 1980 sharply reduced the flow ofgrain from
country points to grain exchanges in terminal markets for resale. Most grain
now moves directly from gatheringpoints in thecountry to domestic users such
as flour mills or to export elevators without moving through a terminal market
for resale. Trading in individual cars of grain is now most likely to occur near
origin points in the country rather than at a terminal market (Changing Face
of Breadstuffs).
In addition to diminishing the role of grain exchanges in the marketing of
cash grain, railroad deregulation has diminished the role ofterminal elevators
at these markets, particularly terminal elevators built many years ago to handle
rail grain. Many of these elevators are now obsolete for grain merchandising
and are suitable only for long-term storage, primarily of government-owned
grain.
Deregulation of the railroads and the associated unit train rates have been
the principal forces tending to decentralize thegrain marketingsystem. Subter-
minal elevators have taken over the function formerly held by many older rail
terminal elevators. They are also likely to replace many country elevators. One
analyst projects thatcountryelevators thatarestill operating 20 years from now
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These changes have heavily affected regional grain marketing cooperatives
thatwereoriginallyestablished to marketgrainatterminal locations. Some have
integrated their operations back toward the country through the ownership of
local elevators and subterminals, thus becoming combination federated and
centralized regional cooperatives. They have also integrated forward toward
export markets through the acquisition and control ofgrain export marketing
infrastructure. Problemsencounteredin thelatterareainducedmanystructural
changes in the 1980s.
Structural Changes in Interregional and
Regional Grain Marketing Cooperatives
One interregional grain marketing cooperative failed during the 1980s and
another was restructured. Inaddition, two farmer-owned regionalcooperatives
were dissolved; two transferred their marketing operations to joint ventures
with IOFs; andseveral mergersinvolving regional grain marketingcooperatives
occurred in the decade. Sizable losses in equity capital were incurred by the
system, and the competitive postureoffarmer-owned cooperatives in the grain
marketingsystem was weakened. Theeconomic reasons behind these structural
changes and their performance implications deserve more analysis than they
have received to date.
The Collapse of Farmers Export Company
Farmers Export Company (FEC), a federation of regional grain marketing
cooperatives, was organized in 1968 for the purpose of marketing farmers'
grain for export. For many years, farmer-owned local and regional grain coop-
eratives had aspired to integrate their operations further up the marketing
chain by developing the capability to make direct sales ofgrain for export. The
USDA's Farmer Cooperative Service reported in the mid-1970s thatlocal grain
cooperatives received about 40 percent of farmer grain sales, but regional
cooperatives handled only half that amount and directly exported only 7 to 8
percent of U.S. exports. It recommended that cooperatives strengthen their
capability for direct export sales (Thurston et al.).
FEC was to be the major vehicle through which this strategy could be imple-
mented. Itexpanded rapidly in the 1970s. At the peakofits operations in 1980,
it owned two major gulf port terminals in Ama, Louisiana, and Galveston,
Texas. It also leased a 3 million bushel Philadelphia elevator and another port
elevator at Portland in the Pacific northwest. In addition, it had agents and
offices in several major foreign cities.
However, by 1981, even before thedecline in U.S. grain exports, FEC experi-
enced difficulties and began to downsize through the sale of port facilities. In
1985, itwas liquidatedthroughthesale to theArcherDaniels Midland Company
of its remaining assets, which consisted mainly of its export elevator at Ama,
Louisiana, its first major investment in the early 1970s.
The collapse of FEC was attributed to several factors, such as the lack of a
global trading partner and lack of a commitment to market cooperatively
through FEC as a central entity (Hofstead). Another cooperative leader also
emphasized lack ofcommitment as follows:74 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
One was the failure ofmembers to fully support FEC. In fact, at least
one regional acquired Gulf elevator assets in direct competition with
grain flowing to FEC, of which it was part owner. (Torgerson)
The same problem was discussed even more pointedly in Fortune as follows:
The bitter rivalries among the members kept them fighting about
which facilities were needed. They seemed to have Mafia-like designs
on one another's territories and business. A couple also had designs
on Farmers Export's foreign markets.
AGRI Industries plunged heavily into the export business on its own,
andlast yearshipped 185 million bushelsoverseas throughotherfacili-
ties. InJune, the big Iowa co-op leased an export terminal (which it is
now trying to buy) in Lake Charles, Louisiana, thatcan'thelpbutdivert
business away from the Farmers Export terminal in Ama, 175 miles
away. In September, just as Farmers Export's burned-out elevator in
Galveston was getting back into operation, AGRI announced plans to
acquire a large competing elevator in Houston. The $36 million deal
was closed in December. (Rowan, p. 156)
It was also reported that the demise of FEC was hastened by losses on large
speculative positions in futures involving old crop-new crop price spreads in
soybeans and corn. Operating personnel in FEC were quoted as saying they
were forced intosuchspeculative tradingto coversubstantialoverheadincurred
from large investments in fixed assets (Rowan).
Ginder (1988) classifies the reasons for the decline in cooperative presence
in the export grainmarketing system into factors inside and outside the system.
He asserts that problems outside the system may have been more important
than the system's internal problems. Factors outside the system he cites are: (1)
a decline in FOB-based sales typical of the era when PL-480 shipments domi-
nated U.S. exports,(2) anincreaseincostandfreight (C & F)- andcostinsurance
and freight (CIF)-based sales, (3) changes in ocean freight, (4) change in any
origin or optional bids, and (5) changes in U.S. agricultural support policy.
The importance of the external factors may be questioned especially when
compared with the internal factors discussed above. Cooperatives expanded
into export marketing with the objective of permitting more CIF grain export
sales. Otherfactors he mentions were hardly new to grainexportmarket partici-
pants, including grain marketing cooperatives (Thurston et al.).
The USDA's Agricultural Cooperative Service reported thecollapseofFarm-
ers Export as "endinganother chapter in the continuing saga ofgrain farmers'
efforts to achieve a farmer-controlled grain marketing system through vertical
coordination" (Torgerson). But, it also marked the beginning of structural
adjustments in other farmer-owned grain marketing cooperatives that were to
follow.
Agri-Trans Corporation Restructured
Agri-Trans Corporation was organized as a river barge transportation com-
pany in the mid-1970s by CF Industries and five regional cooperatives, several
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down river to Gulf export terminals. Then fertilizer was barged up river. By
1981, it owned 465 barges and nine river towboats. As grain exports declined
in the 1980s, barge rates on the river plunged. Many new barges had been built
and added to the barge fleet, resulting in excess capacity. This created financial
problems for Agri-Trans,anditsownerswrotedown theirinvestments (Cooper-
ative Action; Harvest States Cooperatives, 1985). Agri-Trans Corporation was
restructured in 1986 when it entered into a joint venture with the American
River Transportation Company (ARTCO), which is the managing partner.
ARTCO is a subsidiary of the Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM).l
Two Regionals Dissolved
The Producers Grain Corporation of Amarillo, Texas, closed grain opera-
tions in 1982 with AGRI Industries, a regional grain marketing cooperative
headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa, taking over five terminal elevators under
a six-year lease.
Far-Mar-Co, a regionalgrainmarketingcooperativeheadquarteredin Hutch-
inson, Kansas, was also liquidated in 1985. Earlier, Far-Mar-Co had merged
with Farmland Industries, Inc. of Kansas City, becoming a subsidiary of this
regionalfarm supplycooperative. Far-Mar-Cowas oneoftheownersofFarmers
Export and had purchased its export elevator in Galveston, Texas, in 1981
whenFarmers Exportbeganto downsize its operations.Thispurchaseincreased
Far-Mar-Co's debt load, which became increasingly burdensome as grain
exports declined and excess export marketing capacity emerged in the early
1980s. Far-Mar-Co's wheat and milo storage facilities, including the Galveston
elevator, were sold to the Union Equity Co-op Exchange, headquartered in
Enid, Oklahoma. The latter is a regional grain marketing cooperative that
exports sizable quantities of hard red winter wheat.
Two Regionals Transfer Marketing Operations to Joint Ventures
with IOFs
On September 5, 1985, GROWMARK, a regional farm supply and grain
marketing cooperative headquartered in Bloomington, Illinois, and the Archer
Daniels Midland Company (ADM) headquartered in Decatur, Illinois, and one
of the world's largest grain processors, announced a plan to consolidate their
grain marketing and river operations in a new ADM subsidiary called GROW-
MARK Grain. GROWMARK transferredownershipofits seven river terminals
to the new "ADM subsidiary" in exchange for ADM common stock. Substan-
tially, all ADM and GROWMARK terminalsonthe Illinoisand Mississippi rivers
are now referred to as "ADM/GROWMARK."
According to the plan as described, both firms have equal representation on
the GROWMARK Grain board of directors. The co-op is also represented on
ADM's board ofdirectors. Kenneth P. Baer, then executive vice president and
chief executive officer of GROWMARK, described the advantages of thejoint
venture as follows: "ADM needs and wants our system's grain origination capa-
bility, and we need ADM's ability to provide equity capital, their processing
capability, and theirworldwide marketingexpertise." (GROWMARK and ADM
Announce Plans for Joint Venture).76 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
AGRI Industries and Cargill, Inc. also formed a joint venture beginning
March 15, 1986, called AGRI Grain Marketing. As described in a letter to
members, AGRI leasedits four riverelevators to thejointventure. Cargillleased
one river elevator and assigned a second river elevator, in which it has a lease
interest, to thejoint venture, which became an independent organization with
a joint governing board. Despite Cargill's 51 percent controlling interest, the
jointventure was designed to operate onan equal basis including AGRI Indus-
tries members and Cargill grain and processing operations. All transactions are
supposed to be at market prices to ensure this equality. Thejointventure's staff
came from a mergerofAGRI staffand someofCargill's Commodity Marketing
Division's staffin Des Moines. Both these entities ceased operations as separate
independent marketing firms in Iowa.
With the integration of AGRI's grain merchandising and related functions
into the newjoint venture, AGRI Industries became a holding company "func-
tioning as a cooperative enterprise in supporting member services and other
cooperative programs" (Coonrod).
Two Mergers ofRegional Grain Marketing Cooperatives
TheGrainTerminalAssociation, St. Paul, Minnesota, and NorthPacific Grain
Growers, Inc., Portland, Oregon, merged to form Harvest States Cooperatives
onJune 1,1983. The new cooperative, headquartered in St. Paul, Minnesota,
became the nation's largest grain marketing cooperative with revenues of$2.9
billion in the fiscal year ending May 31, 1989. Harvest States has grain export
facilities on the Great Lakes at Duluth/Superior and the Pacific Northwest at
Kalama, Washington. It serves farmers in the Upper Midwest, Pacific North-
west, and adjoiningareas. Besides grain marketing, HarvestStates Cooperatives
has sizable investments in value-added grain processing operations, including
soybean and sunflower seed processing; consumer food products distributing
salad dressing and other vegetable-oil-based products to supermarkets; durum
milling producing semolina for pasta products; barley malting; and livestock
feed manufacturing.
Ohio Farmers Grain and Supply Association merged with Landmark, Inc. to
become Countrymark, Inc. in 1985. Countrymark then purchased the assets of
Agra Land, the cooperative that had emerged in 1983 after the Chapter II
bankruptcy reorganizationofMichigan Farm Bureau Services. Mid-States Ter-
minals, Inc. then became a wholly owned grain subsidiaryofCountrymark, Inc.
(Benschneider).
A more recent structural adjustment involving Countrymark, Inc. and the
Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association (I.F.B.C.A.) is ajoint manage-
mentarrangementannounced by these two regional cooperatives. This, accord-
ing to their board chairman, may lead to the eventualjoiningofthese coopera-
tives. Countrymarkand I.F.B.C.A. are major federated agricultural supplyand
grain marketing cooperatives serving farmers in Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana
Uoint Venture Set by Countrymark, Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative).
A Changed Cooperative Grain Marketing System
The cooperative grain marketing system in 1990 is vastly different from
that of a decade earlier when U.S. grain exports peaked. The downsizing ofGrain Marketing Cooperatives/Dahl 77
Table I.-Percentage of Total Export Elevator Storage Capacity Controlled
by Exporter Group, 1981 and 1989
Exporter Group 1981" 1989b
5 Major Multinationals' 50.3 46.0
Farmer-owned Cooperatives 21.4 15.3
Othersd 28.3 38.7 --
Total 100.0 100.0
aNeilson C. Conklin and Reynold P. Dahl, "Organization and Pricing Efficiency of the U.S. Grain Export System." Minnesota
Agricultural Economist. Agric. Ext. Service. University of Minnesota. No. 635, May 1982. p. 3.
bExport Elevator Directory, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Federal Grain Inspection Service, Jan. 1989.
clnclucles Cargill, Continental, Bunge, Dreyfus, and Garnac.
dlndudes public elevators and elevators operated by port authorities.
interregionaland regional grain marketingcooperatives during the decade was
necessitated by heavy investment in grain marketing infrastructure during the
grain export boom. Excessive leverage made it difficult or impossible for some
ofthese cooperatives to ride out the lean times ofthe 1980s. The share oftotal
export elevator storage capacity controlled by cooperatives declined from 21
percent in 1981 to 15 percent in 1989 (table 1). Also, most of this capacity is
now located on the Great Lakes, the export point through which the smallest
amount of U.S. grain exports moves. Cooperatives no longer control export
space at the Mississippi Gulf through which the largest share of U.S. grain
exports flows.
The share ofport capacity held by the five major multinational grain export-
ingfirms (Cargill, Inc.; ContinentalGrain Company; Bunge Corp.; Louis Drey-
fus Corp.; and Garnac Grain Co., Inc.) also declined from 50 percent to 46
percent during the same period. On the other hand, the share of port storage
capacity held by "other" firms increased from 28 percent to 39 percent. Twoof
the largermultiple portfacility firms in the "other"category include the Archer
Daniels Midland Company and Con Agra, Inc. Both have expanded their grain
operations in recent years.
Most knowledgeable students could hardly conclude that the U.S. system of
regional grain marketing cooperatives has become stronger over the past
decade. But, the strongest part of the farmer-owned grain marketing system
traditionally has been in grain origination through local cooperatives. Many
local grain marketing cooperatives have grown in size and scope ofoperations
through internal growth, mergers, and consolidations. Their larger operations
and capabilities ofhandling unit train shipments indicate that they have taken
on more of the characteristics of subterminals shipping directly to domestic
users or ports for export. Hence, many are not as dependent upon the services
ofa regional cooperative in marketingsingle cars ofgrain as in years past. This
presents a challenge to the regionals in the provision ofother services to their
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Structural Change in the 1990s
The number of grain marketing cooperatives in the United States declined
from 2,475 in 1978 to 2,050 in 1988 (Richardson et al.). A continuation ofthis
trendcan be expected in the 1990s. Excess capacityin unittrainloadingfacilities
may also result in the further restructuring of local grain marketing coopera-
tives. Value-added activities, such as the contract feeding oflivestock, are also
being tried by some local grain marketing cooperatives in parts of the Corn
Belt. Such activities demand a new setofmanagement skills in addition to those
required for grain and farm supply merchandising.
At the regional level, we will probably witness morejoint ventures between
cooperativesand betweencooperativesand IOFs. Value-addedgrain processing
operations will also receive greater emphasis. Harvest States Cooperatives pro-
vides an interestingcase study. Itdownsized its grain marketingoperations, but
expanded its value-added grain processing operations in the 1980s to make it
less vulnerable to the ups and downs of the grain business. For example, the
Feed Division hasexpandedinto moreproductssuch as petfood manufacturing
under private labels for food chains. Harvest States also purchased an IOF
called Holsum Foods, which manufactures margarines, salad dressings, peanut
butter, and shortening. This is a vertical extension ofits Honeymeade Process-
ing Division, which produces and refines soybean oil and meal. Holsum Foods
is oneofthe largestimportersofbulk olives and also produces about 80 percent
ofthe preserves sold by Kraft. Finally, the Amber Milling Division of Harvest
States Cooperatives grinds durum into semolina and durum flour. Pasta con-
sumption in the United States has been increasing at an average annual rate of
7 to 9 percent for several years. The expected annual growth rate in the 1990s
is 5 to 6 percent (pistoria).
Partnership with IOF in Durum Milling
The increased demand for pasta was the motivating force behind a recent
expansion in Harvest States durum milling operations. It formed a partnership
with the Miller Milling Company, an IOF, of Huron, Ohio, where its mill will
be expanded from 6,000 hundredweight to 12,000 hundredweight per day.
Harvest States is the operating partner and retains the majority interest in the
partnership. With this expansion, Amber Milling becomes the second largest
durum miller in the United States, grindingabout 14 million bushels ofdurum
per year (Division Report ofAmber Milling).
Two Regionals Invest in Wheat Flour Milling
Union Equity Cooperative Exchange and Harvest States Cooperatives
recently acquired a combined 10 percentownershipofCereal Food Processors.
This closely held IOF headquartered in Mission Woods, Kansas, is the nation's
fifth largest flour miller and operates nine flour mills in six states, as well as a
drycornmill. Thisalliance will expand thecooperatives'operationsin thevalue-
added product sector and enhance the milling company's access to high quality
wheat. The presidents of the two cooperatives will be elected to the board of
directors ofCereal Foods (Cereal Foods into Alliance with Two Cooperatives).
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two decades. The per capita consumption of wheat flour in the United States
increasedfrom 110 pounds percapita in 1971 to 129 poundspercapitain 1989.
Anotherjointventurebetween HarvestStatesCooperativesand UnionEquity
Cooperative Exchange called Harvest Equity, Inc., based in Lincoln, Nebraska,
is also worthy of mention. This company specializes in cross-country grain
tradingandcurrently provides theonlycooperativealternativeinits geographic
market (Harvest Equity, Inc. Establishes New Market Inroads).
Conclusions
The grain export boom of the 1970s put a severe strain on the marketing
system. Marketing margins increased as the demand for marketing infrastruc-
ture exceeded the supply. This stimulated investments in rail cars, barges,
storage, and port facilities. Much of this new equipment came on-line when
grain exports declined in the 1980s, resulting in excess capacity, reduced mar-
keting margins, firm consolidation, anddownsizing. Structuralchange has been
extensive in farmer-owned cooperatives.
The cooperative grain marketing system in 1990 is vastly different from
that of a decade earlier when U.S. grain exports peaked. One interregional
cooperativefailed andanotherwas restructured; two regionalcooperativeswere
dissolved; two regionals transferredtheirmarketingoperationstojointventures
with IOFs; andseveral mergers involvingregional grainmarketingcooperatives
occurred in the decade. The system had sizable losses in equity capital, and the
share of grain marketed by farmer-owned cooperatives declined.
Changes in grain marketing, transportation, and railroad deregulation have
resulted in a decline in grain exchanges and terminal grain markets in the
marketing ofcash grain. The grain marketing system has become more decen-
tralized, with grain moving directly from gathering points in the country to
domestic users or to ports for export. Many local grain marketing cooperatives
have expanded to handle unit train shipments. Others have consolidated to
form subterminals thatare replacing manycountryelevators andarealso taking
over the function of older rail terminal elevators. These changes had a large
impactonregionalgrainmarketingcooperativesthatwereoriginallyestablished
to market grain for local affiliated cooperatives at terminal locations.
Structural change in the cooperative grain marketing system will likely con-
tinue in the 1990s. The number of local grain marketing cooperatives will
continue to decline. The precipitous decline in grain stocks in 1988-89 resulted
ina reducedincomefrom storageand handlinggovernment-ownedgrainstocks
for most local cooperatives. Excess capacity in unit train shipping in many areas
has also squeezed grain merchandising margins.
Bothlocal and regionalcooperativeswill place moreemphasisonvalue-added
operations such as grain processing and contract feeding of livestock that are
less subject to the ups and downs of grain merchandising. We will probably
witness new innovations in joint ventures between cooperatives and between
cooperatives and IOFs in the 1990s. The economics of joint ventures and
their implications for cooperatives and agribusiness organization will demand
increased study by students of agricultural cooperation in years ahead.80 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION
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1. This information was obtained by personal interview. The author is not aware of
any published information on this joint venture.
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